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Abstract
Countries that rely on natural resource rents (that is, the revenue generated from the sale
of natural resources) may suffer from a variety of social problems. This exploratory study
reviews the natural resource extraction literature to derive a ‘natural resource rents–homicide’
hypothesis. Data for 173 countries for the years 2000 to 2012 are examined to determine if
there is a correlation between natural resource rents and homicide rates. Multilevel growth
models suggest that natural resource rents are positively correlated with homicide rates within
countries (level 1) but not between them (level 2). Importantly, the correlation between natural
resource rents and homicide is strongest when natural resource rents are lagged. We conclude
by suggesting that increasing natural resource rents may be counterproductive over the long run
and sow the seeds for a future increase in homicide.
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Introduction
Recent studies have found that excessive dependence on natural resource extraction revenue tends to be associated with elevated levels of crime in local settings (for example,
Archbold et al., 2014; Carrington et al., 2011; Price et al., 2014; Ruddell, 2011; Ruddell
et al., 2014). The major implication of these studies is that higher rates of crime are the
result of detrimental social processes that are set in motion by a sudden increase in
extraction development followed by a heavy reliance on revenue generated from natural
resources. As yet, however, community-level findings that postulate a relationship
between natural resource revenue and crime have not been replicated cross-nationally
(except see Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). This observation raises the following question:
is there a cross-national correlation between revenue that is generated by natural resource
extraction and crime? To help answer this question we study one type of crime (that is,
homicide rates) and natural resource rents. Homicide is one of the most valid and reliable
cross-national crime indicators (see Neapolitan, 1997), and natural resource rents (NRR)
are often used in development studies as an indicator of the amount of revenue generated
by natural resources (less the cost of extracting those resources) that comes from their
sale in the international market (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005). As a result, we test the
hypotheses that NRR (as a percentage of gross domestic product) and homicide rates are
positively correlated between and within countries.1
The present study begins by exploring the theoretical justification for the NRR–
homicide hypotheses. Specifically, to derive our hypotheses we rely upon two sets of
literature. First, we explore community-level studies that document the relationship
between extraction-related economic activity and crime. Second, we examine crossnational level research by drawing upon the ‘the natural resource curse’ lens that stipulates countries with high NRR face more development-related problems than countries
with low NRR. Within that natural resource curse literature we pay particular attention to
the idea that high NRR countries may potentially harm the economy and encourage civil
violence. We employ a multilevel growth model to test the correlation between NRR and
homicide for 173 countries for the years 2000 to 2012. We then conclude by reflecting
upon our findings in the context of the environmental justice literature and the potential
for future research.
Exploring the potential effect of resource extraction on crime cross-nationally is
important for two reasons. First, policy-makers across the globe regularly make decisions about the pace and extent of resource extraction to generate NRR. Information
about the potential homicide–NRR association might be useful to policy-makers and
affect the kinds of economic policies they select. Second, if a relationship between NRR
and homicide exists, then criminal justice agencies faced with implementing enforcement practices may consider how to use NRR information to better advocate for and
distribute resources to combat crime (Archbold, 2015).

Background
Extractive activities consist of the removal of raw materials from nature (for example, coal,
oil, gas, timber and minerals). These extraction efforts are often promoted by companies
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and governments, and are designed to stimulate revenue for economic development purposes. Local and national governments that are dependent on high NRR may suffer adverse
social and economic consequences. For instance, Adger (2000: 361) suggests that too
much reliance on NRR increases vulnerability to external shocks such as the volatility of
raw material commodity prices. Jacquet (2014: 8321) describes four general types of problem that occur from an over-reliance on NRR: ‘(1) rapid industrialization and loss of governance, (2) uneven distribution of costs and benefits, (3) conflict, and (4) social-psychological
stress and disruption.’ These potential adverse outcomes have led a variety of sociologists
and development scholars to investigate the relationship between high NRR economies
and wellbeing in the case of timber (Fisher, 2001; Wunder, 2001), oil (Obi, 2010), coal
(Perdue and Pavela, 2012) and mineral mining (Pegg, 2006). Together these wellbeing
studies suggest that a variety of social problems, including homicide, are likely to occur
when governments and policy-makers pursue high NRR to boost economic growth.

Community studies
Carrington, Hogg and McIntosh (2011: 353) propose that communities that rely on high
levels of NRR experience greater levels of violence. That is, extractive economies disrupt social life in such a way that crime is more likely to occur. As a result, NRR can
threaten community norms and values and therefore break informal ties and harm community services (Carrington et al., 2011; see also England and Albrecht, 1984;
Freudenburg and Jones, 1991; Hunter et al., 2002; Wilkinson, 1991). However, it is not
just a matter of elevated NRR promoting crimes such as homicide. It is also a matter of
rapid social change that may occur in areas of high NRR. For instance, as Durkheim suggested in the 19th century with his concept of anomie, rapid social change disrupts community organization and attenuates social bonds, creating a sense of normlessness in the
community that often leads to increases in crime (Durkheim, 2014 [1902]; see also
Messner, 1989, for an empirical application to homicide rates).
The idea of social disorganization is often used to describe the condition faced by
communities that undergo a rapid transition to an NRR-based economy (Ruddell et al.,
2014). The increase in urbanization, industrialization and immigration that occurs along
with rapid expansion of NRR may break social bonds and threaten conventional community beliefs and values. This disorganization can then lead to an increase in crime and
delinquency (Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003; Shaw and McKay, 1942). Jacquet (2014: 8321)
makes the connection between natural resource extraction and crime, drawing directly
on concepts used in the social disorganization literature, suggesting that the loss of closeknit social ties can result in a loss of institutions (church groups, neighbourhood associations, etc.) that historically provide informal control over social problems including
crime, drug abuse and mental illness, instead requiring formal organizations such as the
police and court system to address these problems. Ruddell et al. (2014) propose that
social disorganization may increase during a natural resource boom, and that is what
leads to observed increases in crime. Anecdotal observations appear to confirm Ruddell
et al.’s (2014: 4) supposition, as reports by some law enforcement officials and residents
of high extraction communities suggest that a ‘violent element’ is attracted to the employment opportunities brought on by rapid resource extraction that promotes social
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disorganization. As a result of these changes, communities that quickly become reliant
on NRR are sometimes called ‘energy boom towns’.
Energy boom towns may also face rapid population growth, industrialization and flyin, fly-out (FIFO) patterns of predominately male workers (Ruddell et al., 2014). This
pattern of community development disrupts the normal patterns of life in the mostly rural
areas where extraction takes place. The new residents and FIFO workers often cause
problems for long-time residents, such as unemployment, increases in social-psychological stress and substance abuse (Jacquet, 2014). The transient nature of the workforce
that migrates into quickly developing NRR economies may even create stress for local
services because those employed in the industry often work shifts around the clock, disrupting families where increases in violent crimes such as domestic abuse have been
reported (Carrington et al., 2011).
As noted, the rapid growth of extraction revenue may attract people seeking various
types of work that ‘disrupt normal patterns of interaction’ (Ruddell et al., 2014: 3). Not
surprisingly, changes in community values also affects the way that law enforcement
responds to crime, reducing community service functions and increasing law enforcement functions. That is, police become more focused on catching and arresting criminals
while reluctantly allowing minor disorder to flourish (Archbold, 2015).
Several empirical studies draw upon the social disorganization thesis to test the relationship between NRR and crime. As previously noted, these studies generally indicate
that high-NRR economies also tend to have elevated levels of crime (for example,
Archbold et al., 2014; Ruddell et al., 2014). For instance, recent research by Price et al.
(2014) uncovers a relationship between the number of gas extraction wells (which presumably correlate to higher levels of NRR) and crime across local communities. The
relationship between NRR and crime at the community level of analysis has also been
observed within other developed countries such as Australia and Canada (Carrington
et al., 2011; Ruddell, 2011).
A few studies propose that there is no correlation between NRR and crime (Wilkinson
et al., 1982). Ruddell et al. (2014), for instance, found that although increases in NRR
activity were followed by increases in index crime, high-NRR communities had similar
index crime rates to low-NRR communities. Thus, Ruddell et al.’s results indicate that,
in the case of homicide rates, it is the change in NRR and not the absolute level of NRR
that matters. In addition, Hunter, Krannich and Smith (2002) point out that, although
communities that pursue high levels of NRR as an economic strategy could eventually
recover from elevated levels of NRR-related crime, perceptions of crime would be most
intense for those socially disadvantaged residents living in high-NRR communities.
In sum, previous community-level research highlights how elevated and increasing
NRR can foster disorganization. In turn, disorganization weakens community social
bonds and creates individual and community-level stress that produces the right conditions for crime, including violence and homicide.

Cross-national studies
Whereas problems associated with natural resource extraction are largely studied at the
community level, the focus of this research is cross-national. As community scholars
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note, however, the same social processes that disrupt and disorganize communities may
also be at work within and across countries. When studying extraction in communities,
Freudenburg (1992: 307) proposed that ‘newly industrializing nations [may also suffer
from natural resource addiction because] extractive activities are seen as having the
potential to open up entire regions to economic development’.
Cross-national literature on the problems associated with NRR as a form of development can be broadly broken down into those studies that focus on economic growth and
those that focus on civil unrest and violence. In 1990, Auty suggested that some countries
experience the ‘curse of natural resources’.2 Like community-level research, the natural
resource curse hypothesis proposes that development problems are likely to arise in
economies that rely heavily on NRR.3 Shortly after Auty developed this thesis, Sachs and
Warner used empirical data to study the effects of the resource curse, noting specifically
that a ‘surprising [feature] of modern economic growth is that economies with abundant
natural resources grow less rapidly than natural-resource-scarce economies’ (1995: 1).
Their research demonstrates that developing countries with high levels of natural
resource exports (for example oil, minerals and agriculture), expressed as a percentage
of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1970, tended to experience slower economic growth
over the next decade (see also Sachs and Warner 1997, 1999). Importantly, Sachs and
Warner (1995, 1997) show that only 2 countries rich in natural resources (Malaysia and
Mauritius) out of 19 did not experience a decline in GDP during the 1970s. The primary
reasons that Sachs and Warner (2001) give for this general undesirable relationship is
that countries rich in natural resources may be harming GDP by disrupting more traditional manufacturing growth. In other words, increases in natural resource extraction
may quickly elevate wages and product prices within countries, making it harder for
manufacturing to compete with other exports in the global marketplace. Sachs and
Warner (2001: 833) note that, ‘[w]hatever the cause [for lower GDP], it is clear that we
have not seen strong export-led growth in resource abundant economies’.
The implications of these economic problems have also led scholars to think about the
relationship between NRR and homicide. Specifically, comparative researchers believe
that NRR may produce a variety of social problems, including violence (Collier and
Hoeffler, 2002). This more recent strand of research is similar to what is being proposed
by community-level scholars – that the resource curse may create conflict and violence
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; De Soysa and Neumayer, 2007; Ross, 2003; Skaperdas,
2002). Violence related to natural resources that occurs globally has garnered significant
attention in the press, especially when related to conflicts over resources such as oil and
minerals. In the popular press these conflicts are sometimes framed to highlight the violence behind their production and extraction (Eligon, 2011). For example, ‘blood diamonds’ or ‘conflict timber’ illustrate the social harm associated with the extraction of
certain forms of natural resources (Mullins and Rothe 2008; Orogun, 2004; Van Solinge
2008). Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore (2005) also found ‘a diamonds curse’, indicating
that, in the case of secondary diamonds, there was an increase in the likelihood of ethnic
fighting.4 For example, murders and missing persons in Colombia are all too often associated with the capture of productive lands for the purpose of extracting palm oil (Borras
and Franco, 2010a, 2010b). As a result, conflict over land associated with valuable natural resources may quickly lead to elevated murder rates (Myers, 1997). Moreover, as
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Downey, Bonds and Clark (2010) suggest, there are many different forms of extraction
(for example mining and timber) that may encourage violence and murder in some
countries.
There are some additional reasons that NRR may generate violence at a cross-national
level. First, some researchers describe violence as a function of ‘looting rebels’ (Mildner
et al., 2011). That is, in nation-states with weak governments, rebels can forcibly and
violently take NRR as a method of funding political conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2002:
625) conclude that NRR generate ‘low opportunity costs for rebellion and make civil war
more likely’. Moreover, NRR reliance may challenge weak governments because law
enforcement is strained and cannot provide protection in areas that can potentially generate high amounts of resource revenue. Thus, as Ross (2003: 25) contends, ‘this opens the
door for criminal gangs, warlords, and rogue military officers’.
To date, there is only one academic study that examines the association between NRR
and homicide rates at the cross-national level (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Specifically,
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) studied deliberate killings and civil war deaths as a function
of NRR.5 Collier and Hoeffler (2004) hypothesize that civil war deaths and homicides
are likely to share predictors (that is, independent variables). The researchers conduct a
cross-sectional analysis that illustrates important differences between the dependent
variables. Specifically, they find that both ethnic dominance and NRR are positively correlated with the risk of civil war and that neither variable is correlated with homicide.
Nevertheless, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) conclude that this finding requires further
empirical investigation.
In sum, the literature on the impact of natural resource extraction and the resultant
rents suggests the following two hypotheses, which we test in this article.
Hypothesis 1: Annual increases in a country’s natural resource rents are associated with annual
increases in the country’s homicide rents (that is, the within-country hypothesis).
Hypothesis 2: Countries with higher average natural resource rents will have higher homicide
rates compared with countries with lower natural resource rents (that is, the between-country
hypothesis).

Methods
We examine the cross-national correlation between NRR and homicide rates using multilevel models for change. This procedure models one dependent variable and multiple
independent variables (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008; Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).
Multilevel change models are particularly appropriate for examining the relationship
between NRR and homicide because they allow for the simultaneous estimations of
year-to-year changes within individual countries (level 1) as well as between countries
(level 2). Thus, we can assess the important question of whether NRR appear to facilitate
homicide over time (within country), across space (between countries), or both. As per
convention, we control for year in all of the statistical models.
We gathered data on natural resource extraction and other competing explanations of
homicide for the years 2000 to 2012 for the 173 countries for which homicide and natural
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Figure 1. The natural log of homicide rates, 2000–12 (n = 828).

resource data were available over time (listed in Appendix 1). All of the variables used in
our regression models of homicide are described below, with descriptive statistics for the
overall sample presented in Appendix 2 and the between- and within-country variances
listed in Appendix 3. We now turn to the description of the variables used in our
models.

Dependent variable
Our dependent variable is the homicide rate, measured as homicides per 100,000 persons. We focus our analysis on homicide rates because community and cross-national
studies suggest that violence may be related to NRR and because homicide data are
widely acknowledged to be the most valid and reliable cross-national indicator of violence (Neapolitan, 1997). As a result, it is possible to examine the variability in the homicide rate per country and per year (2000 to 2012).
The total number of homicides per country, per year was extracted from the Global
Study on Homicide 2013 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014), which
compiles world homicide statistics over time. Data in this report are derived from criminal justice or public health systems and are verified through validity checks (see United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014: 110–11). These data intend to measure all
recorded ‘unlawful deaths purposefully inflicted on a person by another person’ (United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014: 109). Because the distribution of homicide
data is substantially non-normal across countries over time (skewness = 2.5, kurtosis =
7.7), we take the natural log of the variable to produce a better-fitting regression line and
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more normally distributed regression residuals. As noted in Figure 1, the distribution of
the transformed homicide rate variable is relatively normal – even if slightly bimodal
(skewness = 0.20, kurtosis = −0.79).
The natural log of homicide improves model fit substantially and reduced the standard error estimates at both level 1 and level 2, allowing for a better test of the natural
resource curse–homicide hypothesis between and within countries.

Natural resource extraction
We are interested in determining whether NRR is correlated with homicide rates between
and/or within countries. Thus, we collected data on NRR for each country over time as a
way to estimate the extent of extraction activity in a country as well as to measure how
much a particular country relies on revenue generated from the sale of natural resources.
NRR are one common measure of extraction relative to revenue. NRR data represent the
surplus value or economic profits as a percentage of GDP that results from the sale of
non-renewable natural resources (oil, gas, coal, minerals and timber). NRR, as a portion
of GDP, are also often used as a measure of natural resource wealth in the natural resource
curse literature (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005). As previously noted, as NRR increase, homicide should also increase because this form of economic development harms social life
and leads to disruption and disorganization in communities and countries. Moreover,
high NRR may promote political conflict between some countries at the national level.
The NRR data are also highly skewed and peaked (skewness = 2.41, kurtosis = 4.36)
because some countries rely heavily on NRR and others virtually not at all. As a result,
we take the natural log of NRR because it helps to correct for the non-linear relationships
that emerge between NRR and homicide (skewness = 0.71, kurtosis = 1.78). NRR data
are available from the World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org; see also Hamilton and
Clemens, 1998, for further discussion of NRR).

Control variables
Several variables that might have an impact on the relationship between NRR and homicide must be controlled in the statistical analysis of NRR and homicides. Based on prior
studies, GDP is one major variable that needs to be controlled in the analysis of homicide
rates. GDP per capita across countries over time is collected from the World Bank and
measured in thousands of US dollars per person. It is the market value of production,
services and sales. The relationship between GDP and homicide is mixed in the literature, which finds positive, negative and no relationship between the variables (Pridemore
and Trent, 2010). We also control for income inequality using the Gini index. The Gini
index is obtained from the World Bank dataset and is frequently used as a measure of
income inequality in social science research (http://data.worldbank.org). Gini is noted to
be positively correlated with homicide rates in cross-national studies (Barber, 2006;
Bjerregaard and Cochran, 2008; Nivette, 2011).
We control for three additional economic variables that were also collected from the
World Bank. First, we control for the percentage of unemployed in each country each
year since this variable has also been linked with homicide rates (Huang, 2001). That is,
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as unemployment increases across countries, so does homicide. Second, infant mortality
is controlled when testing the relationship between NRR and homicide. Infant mortality
measures the number of infants who die before the age of 1 per 1000 live births. Infant
mortality is an indicator of poverty that should be positively associated with homicide
rates between and within countries. Finally, foreign direct investment (FDI) is controlled
and is an indicator of the direct investment of equity capital and the reinvestment of earnings into the economy as a proportion of GDP. Direct investment is typically not examined in homicide studies, but could drive NRR that impact on homicide rates. As a result,
we examine the relationship between direct investments before NRR are included in the
analysis to see if it is a potential mechanism that helps specify the relationship between
NRR and homicide.
In addition to economic controls, we include five population indicators, one indicator
of governance and one regional indicator. The percentage of the population in each country residing in an urban area is obtained from the World Bank and controlled in the analysis because increased urbanization has been linked to elevated homicide rates in some
cross-national studies (Fischer, 1975). It is also an indicator of social disorganization
because it has been argued that increases in urbanization are related to increases in crime.
Population, measured in billions of residents, is also controlled in the analysis and allows
us to assess if more populated countries or countries that grow in population also experience higher homicide rates. To account for age structure and gender we include the percentage of the population aged 0–14 years, the percentage of the population aged 15–64
years and the percentage of the population that is female.6 Democracy is examined as a
control variable and is measured using the report Freedom in the World, produced by
Freedom House (https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world). The database
documents each country’s political freedom in a ‘freedom index’ over time, using a rating that ranges from ‘1’ (most free) to ‘7’ (least free). We reverse-coded the democracy
variable so higher values represent countries that have higher political freedom. We also
include a measure of corruption, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI; Transparency
International, 2016). The CPI is measured on a scale ranging from 0 (highly corrupt) to
10 (very clean). We reverse-coded CPI so higher values represent higher levels of corruption. Finally, the region of the world in which a country is located is included only in
the between effects portion of the analysis, divided into the seven categories available in
the World Bank data (Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia Pacific, Europe Central Asia, Latin
America Caribbean, Middle East North and North Africa, North America and South
America). This variable is entered into the analysis as a dummy variable and the reference category is Sub-Saharan Africa (see Appendix 2).

Analysis
To test the hypothesis that there is a positive correlation between NRR and homicide
rates we use data for the 173 countries listed in Appendix 1 for the years 2000–12. Table
1 presents multilevel growth model estimates that test the viability of the notion that
NRR and homicide are related. As noted, level-1 variables allow us to estimate the values
of each variable at a specific year, and the level-2 variables average the values of the
variable (that is, a grand mean centred) for each country from 2000 to 2012. In Table 1
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Table 1. Multilevel growth model coefficients of cross-national homicide rate for all countries,
2000–12.
Model 1
Level 1: Within country
Natural resource rents (lag)
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births)
GDP per capita (US$ 000)
Foreign direct investment (as percent of GDP)
Percent unemployed
Democracy (Freedom Index)
Population (billion)
Percent urban
Corruption (Corruption Perception Index)
Percent aged 0–14 years
Percent aged 15–64 years
Percent female
Year
Level 2: Between countries
Natural resource rents (lag)
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births)
GDP per capita (US$ 000)
Foreign direct investment (as percent of GDP)
Inequality index (Gini)
Percent unemployed
Democracy (Freedom Index)
Population (billion)
Percent urban
Corruption (Corruption Perception Index)
Percent aged 0–14 years
Percent aged 15–64 years
Percent female
Region (vs. Sub-Saharan Africa)
East Asia Pacific
Europe Central Asia
Latin America Caribbean
Middle East North Africa
North America
South America
Constant
−2LL
AIC
BIC
N
No. of countries

Model 2

Model 3

0.245 (0.268)
−0.025 (0.020)
−0.344 (1.279)
−0.001 (0.004)
0.032 (0.017)
−0.716 (0.941)
0.031 (0.006)***
0.049 (0.019)**
0.006 (0.024)
0.047 (0.021)*
0.039 (0.048)
−0.033 (0.006)***

0.040 (0.019)*
−0.563 (0.397)
0.042 (0.034)
0.711 (1.364)
−0.002 (0.005)
0.025 (0.021)
−0.028 (1.758)
0.021 (0.011)
0.049 (0.025)*
−0.049 (0.036)
−0.001(0.033)
−0.112 (0.060)
−0.046 (0.009)***

−1.324 (0.523)*
0.047 (0.092)
12.762 (12.57)
0.029 (0.010)**
0.030 (0.011)**
−0.060 (0.045)
1.095 (1.010)
−0.029 (0.008)***
0.011 (0.068)
0.119 (0.037)**
0.040 (0.041)
0.450 (0.087)***

−0.011 (0.054)
−0.648 (0.598)
−0.004 (0.099)
11.60 (12.71)
0.031 (0.011)**
0.031 (0.012)**
−0.030 (0.049)
0.288 (1.832)
−0.019 (0.013)
0.033 (0.071)
0.170 (0.047)***
0.079 (0.050)
0.579 (0.096)***

−0.361 (0.360)
−0.330 (0.373)
0.481 (0.291)
−0.832 (0.368)
0.313 (0.512)
0.237 (0.348)
32.32 (14.01)*
−54.168
174.336
332.594
894
112

−0.372 (0.364)
−0.290 (0.379)
0.552 (0.293)
−0.713 (0.387)
0.377 (0.517)
0.287 (0.353)
60.21 (18.83)**
−29.14
128.279
281.938
596
111

0.076 (0.019)***

−0.015 (0.004)***
0.010 (0.036)

−1.196 (0.211)***
−1.361 (0.175)***
0.651 (0.192)**
−1.751 (0.216)***
−1.126 (0.553)*
−0.954 (0.314)**
31.90 (7.925)***
−246.354
516.708
573.264
823
169

Notes: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed); standard errors are in parentheses.

we estimate three multilevel growth models for homicide rates. The first model (Model
1) examines the relationship between a five-year lag of NRR and homicide controlling
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only for region and year. We estimate the five-year lag of rents for theoretical and empirical reasons. That is, we rely on the natural resource curse literature, which notes that the
impact of any resource curse is delayed rather than immediate (Ross, 2003). Also important, as noted below, is that the five-year lag produces the best-fitting model of NRR and
homicide. We return to the issue of lagging NRR below, however, suggesting that, if
social disruption and disorganization intensify over time, the lag in NRR produces the
strongest correlation and is theoretically justified. Model 2 displays results for the impact
of the control variables on homicide. Model 3 combines Model 1 and Model 2 variables
to show the impact of NRR on homicide while controlling for typical variables used in
cross-national analysis.

Missing data
As noted earlier, cross-national homicide data are the most available and reliable crossnational crime indicator. However, it still suffers from missing data, particularly when
employing longitudinal analysis (Neapolitan, 1997). In order to add validity to our findings we examined the distribution of missing data in the dataset for patterns and then
employed several modelling strategies.
The frequency of missing cases for each variable is reported in Appendix 4. It is clear
that homicide rates have a substantial number of missing values (n = 915). This is potentially problematic, but it is the reality of modelling cross-national homicide rates longitudinally. Several independent variables (that is Gini, percent unemployed, democracy
and corruption) also have a number of missing values. The Gini index has a very large
percentage of missing values (72.48 percent), suggesting that perhaps it should be eliminated from the models. We did not include it in the level-1 portion of the models for this
reason; however, because the level-2 models are averaged between effects, we were able
to keep it in level 2. Recall, level-2 coefficients are the average effects of the variable
over the time period under study, 2000–12. Since every country in the model had a least
one value of the Gini index during that time period, there are no missing values of Gini
at level 2. We next employed the Stata 13.1 command – misstable pattern – to the dataset, which produces an analysis of all the different permutations of missing values. The
three most common patterns of missing data in the dataset are, (1) values of all variables
except missing Gini (n = 504), (2) values of all variables except missing Gini and homicide (n = 388) and (3) values of all variables except missing Gini, homicide and corruption (n = 117). All other permutations of missing data patterns had fewer than 100 cases.
As noted, missing Gini values do not affect the results because it is not included in
level-1 results, and missing homicide values are a common limitation to cross-national
homicide studies (Neapolitan, 1997). However, the majority of existing cross-national
studies are cross-sectional; in our longitudinal study the missing values have less of an
impact on the results because we are modelling change. For example, if a country is
missing a value for the corruption indicator for 2001, the multilevel change model will
ignore the missing value and model the corruption change for that country between 2000
and 2002. Additionally, there are not missing values at level 2 for any of the variables
because they are average values for 2000–12.
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To further validate our results we modelled the data in three ways. First, we used
listwise deletion and removed any country from the analysis that had a missing value on
any variable. We next restricted the results to cases that had no missing values of NRR.
Finally, we used the mi suite of commands in Stata to impute all missing values of all the
independent variables in the analysis. The findings for the NRR variable were very similar in each method of analysis, resulting in the coefficients having the same level of statistical significance in each approach. We report the models from the first approach
(listwise deletion) here.

Results
Model 1 (Table 1) suggests that NRR are related to homicide, but only within countries
(level 1) and not between them (level 2). That is, within countries the correlation between
the natural log of NRR and the natural log of the homicide rate is .076 (p < .001; twotailed). More specifically, a one unit annual change in the log of NRR is associated with
a .076 unit annual change in the log of the homicide rate. As a result, Model 1 (level 1)
suggests that, when examining the bivariate association between NRR and homicide
rates, the two variables are positively correlated within (and not between) countries.
Model 2 – the control variable model – finds that several predictors are significantly
related to NRR. Increases in the percentage of the population residing in urban areas are
associated with increases in homicide rates (level 1). Governments that become more
corrupt within countries experience associated increases in homicide rates (level 1).
Increases in the percentage of the population aged 15–64 years are associated with
increases in homicide rates (level 1). Income inequality is also positively correlated with
homicide rates across countries (level 2) and implies that countries with high levels of
income inequality also tend to have higher homicide rates. Percentage unemployed, percentage 0–14 years and percentage female are all positively correlated with homicide
rates between countries (level 2). Interestingly, GDP per capita is not significantly related
to homicide rates either within or between countries. This is not surprising because
cross-national studies of homicide have found negative, positive and no significant relationship between GDP per capita and homicide rates (Pridemore and Trent, 2010), indicating that this relationship is empirically unclear.
Level-2 (Model 2) results for infant mortality and percentage urban are unusual.
Infant mortality, an indicator of poverty, is negatively related to homicide rates in Model
2 (level 2), a strange finding given that poverty should be related to homicide rates across
countries (Pridemore, 2008). Model 2 also suggests an odd finding for percentage urban.
Specifically, countries with higher percentages of population residing in urban areas
have lower homicide rates compared with countries with smaller urban populations. The
remaining control variables (FDI, democracy and region) do not appear to be correlated
with homicide rates.
Importantly, Model 3 (Table 1) provides support for the position that NRR continue
to be correlated with homicide even after controlling for important factors that may influence homicide rates across countries. That is, according to Model 3 (level 1) a one unit
annual change in the log of NRR is associated with a 0.040 unit annual change in the log
of the homicide rate. The addition of NRR to Model 2 also helps explain the odd findings
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Figure 2. Relationship between natural resource rents (lagged by 0 to 11 years) and homicide
rates.

for infant mortality and percentage urban (both at level 2). Specifically, infant mortality
and percentage urban become statistically insignificant in Model 3 (level 2) when NRR
are included in the model, suggesting the relationship in Model 2 may have been a result
of model misspecification. In the case of infant mortality, this finding perhaps implies
that NRR may influence both poverty and homicide – a result that is consistent with the
natural resource curse literature. That is, the changes in the type of development matter
when it comes to homicide rates. Importantly, then, it appears that, within countries when
relevant predictors of homicide are included in the model, only the type of economic
development (natural resource rents) is related to homicide rates at level 1.
The results for NRR at level 2 (Model 3) are also important. The correlation between
NRR and homicide remains non-existent at level 2 (Model 3), signifying that it is the
change in NRR as opposed to the level of NRR that matters. It is interesting to note that
these results are similar to the Ruddell et al.’s (2014) community-level findings that there
are no differences between local communities that engage in natural resource extraction
and those that do not, but those communities that do engage in extraction observe
increases in crime over time. Thus, local findings appear to be supported at the crossnational level in Table 1.
The relationship between NRR and homicide requires some additional attention. That
is, if NRR and homicide are correlated, how does that correlation emerge over time? As
previously noted, we lagged NRR to examine the relationship between NRR and homicide. Figure 2 examines that lag in more detail – seeking to identify potential patterns in
the relationship between NRR and homicide. An identified pattern in this relationship is
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important because it indicates whether countries may simply live with an increasing
homicide rate over the short term. That is, if the relationship between NRR and homicide
becomes weak over time, that might suggest that countries that adopt natural resource
related development as a form of economic development simply need to ‘wait it out’.
Since higher-extraction countries do not appear to have higher homicide rates, as indicated in Table 1, the within-country potential impact of increases in homicide rates may
be short lived. Next, we investigate whether NRR is likely to have a delayed impact, by
examining the correlation between its lag and homicide rates. The lagged analysis helps
to determine if the potential impact of NRR on homicide is short lived (assuming such a
relationship does indeed exist, as Table 1 suggests).
Figure 2 charts the level-1 coefficients for each lag of NRR on homicide in a multilevel model that controls for region, income inequality and the Gini index. The figure
shows that the relationship between homicide rates and NRR is complex in that it
emerges gradually over time. For example, at level 1 the relationship between that log of
NRR and homicide – controlling for GDP, Gini and region – is not statistically significant until NRR is lagged by three years (coefficient = .04; p < .05). However, the association gradually increases so that by year 10 the association between NRR and homicide is
.08 (p < .05). Thus, although it appears that having high levels of NRR is not a problem,
countries that increase their reliance on NRR appear to create a significant problem over
the long run with respect to increasing homicide rates. That is, it appears that the impact
of increases in NRR matter for homicide rates in the future.

Conclusion
Community- and country-level studies suggest that an overreliance on NRR may produce crime and violence. As an extension of this position we argued that a reliance on
NRR may disrupt and disorganize social life and lead to higher levels of homicide. We
tested the NRR–homicide hypothesis at the country level for the years 2000 to 2012 by
examining the correlation between NRR and homicide rates. Our multilevel findings
suggest that there is a correlation between NRR and homicide rates, but that correlation
exists only with respect to changing reliance on NRR within countries. That is, the relationship between NRR and homicide does not appear between countries and highextraction countries do not, on average, tend to have higher homicide rates. As a result,
the NRR–homicide hypothesis suggests that within-country trends in NRR and homicide are positively correlated over time, whereas the between-country NRR–homicide
hypothesis was rejected. This is an interesting finding because it suggests that rapid
increases in NRR increase homicide, but that overall levels of NRR do not. To illustrate
these different patterns it is helpful to briefly examine two specific countries.
Guatemala’s homicide rate increased from 25.9 to 39.9 between 2000 and 2012, and its
NRR increased from 2.4 percent to 4.2 percent over the same time frame. Guatemala’s
NRR and homicide rates both almost doubled, demonstrating the within-group crossnational finding at a national level; that is, rapid increases in NRR are associated with
rapid increases in homicide rates. In contrast, in 2012, Saudi Arabia’s NRR was 48.18
percent, indicating that almost half of the entire country’s GDP comes from NRR.
However, in the same year, Saudi Arabia’s homicide rate was 0.8, one of the lowest of
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all countries in the dataset. As we found by failing to reject the between-country hypotheses, just because Saudi Arabia has a very high NRR value this does not mean that it
will also have a high homicide rate. The effect of NRR comes when there is a rapid
change in rents, not the overall value of the NRR.
The potential role of NRR in organizing homicide rates has implications for policymakers who might be contemplating a shift to heavy reliance on NRR for development.
First, although it is often assumed that natural resource extraction is unsustainable and
leads to economic harm and environmental destruction over the long run, we believe
there is an additional reason for caution. Specifically, although NRR may stimulate
revenue in the short run it can also lead to increases in social problems, such as homicide, over the long run. There is no evidence to suggest that countries with high extraction rates have high homicide rates, but there is reason to suspect that social change
– especially related to development – may contribute to changes in homicide. In some
respects our findings regarding NRR sum up the essential nature of developmental
change (that is, Durkheim, 2014 [1902]). That is, significant levels of social and economic change – and not the end result of that change – are what produce social problems such as homicide.
Second, if there is a relationship between NRR and homicide, then social institutions
(for example, law enforcement) are likely to require more state support in countries that
begin to shift their economies toward NRR-based economies (Archbold et al., 2014).
However, extensively extractive economies are often viewed as overtly oppressive and
many have been accused of using direct and forcible control to facilitate extraction. This
situation is likely to raise human rights issues because state power may be directed
toward facilitating state violence to increase NRR rather than reducing social violence to
promote development. Although we do not have the space in this article, future research
should examine whether development centred on NRR also promotes political violence,
rather than the relatively non-political crime of homicide as it is measure in this study.
Nevertheless, it could certainly be argued that the developed countries using extracted
resources should be paying the costs associated with combating the additional homicide
they create. This is even more important because countries that turn to NRR as a form of
development are probably the least likely to adequately support state services that might
serve to reduce violence. This particular situation could be viewed through an environmental justice lens, suggesting that environmental extraction produces harmful outcomes
that are most likely to be imposed on less developed countries. In the end we argue that
the role of natural resource extraction and the NRR–homicide hypothesis needs more
serious consideration in cross-national studies of homicide because it may be counterproductive to the development process. We hope our findings have generated more interest in such research and recommend two areas for potential future study.
First, NRR are likely to vary by a country’s location in the international economy
(Wallerstein, 1974), and underdeveloped as well as some developing nations are more
likely to have economies linked to NRR than are developed nations. Scholars have
argued that the majority of revenue generated from NRR does not help local economies;
rather, because the extraction was funded by FDI, most of the profit leaves the local area
and often the entire country (see Stiglitz, 2002: 67–73). This suggests that future research
needs to examine the effects of foreign capital on social disorganization and homicide.
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We not only find that countries with higher NRR have slightly higher homicide rates
in general, but also suggest that within highly extractive countries an association between
NRR and homicide is most likely to exist over time. As a result, it is possible that the
effect of NRR on crime may harm some nations and not others, and that further analysis
of this issue is required. Unfortunately, data on homicide are least likely to be collected
in countries that are underdeveloped and have high NRR. We are not the first researchers
to face data problems with respect to missing data among poorer countries with respect
to cross-national homicide rates. Thus, future studies might look to various indicators of
violence that better capture the impact of developmental change on homicide and violence more generally in less economically developed countries.
Second, our study examines the impact of NRR on homicide over only a relatively
short period of time (13 years). That is, the true social impacts and cumulative nature of
resource-based economies may not be realized for decades after the increases in NRR
occur. Current limitations in cross-national homicide data (and control variables) do not
allow for an expanded look at long-term cross-national homicide trends yet. However, as
data continue to become available this relationship should be monitored. Although there
are considerable calls for alternative energy development and use across the globe, we
anticipate that rates of extraction of coal, oil and gas will continue to increase for some
time because the demand for energy in the global economy has shown few signs of contracting in the near future.
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Notes
1.

2.
3.
4.

5.

6.

We use the phrase ‘natural resource rents’ (NRR) throughout the article to refer to the amount
of revenue generated from the extraction and sale of natural resources. Other terms sometimes
used for this in the literature include ‘natural resource wealth’, ‘natural resource income’ and
‘natural resource revenue’. We use the phrase ‘natural resource extraction’ only when referring explicitly to the act of extraction.
That term was later modified and is now known as ‘the natural resource curse’ (see Frankel,
2010).
Gelb (1988) also examined this idea through the study of oil-producing states. Specifically, he
examined how oil revenues in the 1970s helped and harmed developing oil exporters.
Although there is considerable support for the relationship between natural resource wealth
and violence, not all researchers find that relationship. For instance, Brunnschweiler and
Bulte (2009) discovered that natural resource riches do not increase violence for the 97 countries they studied between 1960 and 2004.
Collier and Hoeffler (2004: 5) note that, for their variables, ‘there is little variation over time
[and as a result] there is a loss of efficiency in examining within country differences’. As a
result, they relied on a cross-sectional analysis of homicide rates.
Many cross-sectional studies of homicide rates include the percentage of males aged 15–24
in their analyses to account for the fact that this is often seen as a group that commits a high
level of crime. These data are not available for all of the countries in the analysis for all of the
years. Therefore we include the age structure and the percent female variables as proxies.
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Appendix 1
Table 2. List of countries in the analysis (N = 173).
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Aruba
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas, The
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Central African
Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Congo, Rep.

Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia, The
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hong Kong SAR,
China
Hungary
India
Indonesia

Mexico
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.
Moldova
Mongolia
Montenegro
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama

Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu

Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru

Venezuela, RB
Vietnam
Yemen, Rep.

Iran, Islamic Rep.
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan

Zambia
Zimbabwe

Kenya
Kiribati

Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Russian Federation
Rwanda
Samoa
Sao Tome and
Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal

Kosovo
Kuwait
Kyrgyz Republic
Lao PDR
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho

Serbia
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
South Africa
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Table 2. (Continued)
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark

Liberia
Libya
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macao SAR, China

Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt, Arab Rep.
El Salvador

Macedonia, FYR
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritania

South Sudan
Spain
Sri Lanka
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian Arab Republic

Appendix 2
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for variables in the analysis.
Variable

Mean

Standard deviation

Natural log of homicide
Natural log of natural resource rents
GDP per capita (US$ 000)
Gini
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births)
Percent unemployed
Foreign direct investment (US$ 000)
Percent urban
Population (billion)
Democracy (Freedom Index)
Corruption (Corruption Perception Index)
Percent aged 0–14 years
Percent aged 15–64 years
Percent female

1.42
1.33
1.00
40.46
33.20
9.04
0.01
53.91
0.04
4.64
6.86
30.56
62.10
50.02

1.24
1.89
1.58
9.99
29.25
6.34
0.01
23.23
0.14
2.09
2.14
10.83
7.06
2.86

Region

Percent countries in region

East Asia & Pacific
Europe & Central Asia
Latin America & Caribbean
Middle East & North Africa
North America
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa

13.87
27.75
17.34
10.98
1.16
4.05
24.86
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Appendix 3
Table 4. Between and within variance.
Variable

Between

Within

Natural log homicide
Natural log resource rents
GDP per capita (US$ 000)
Gini
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births)
Percent unemployed
Foreign direct investment (US$ 000)
Percent urban
Population (billion)
Democracy (Freedom Index)
Corruption (Corruption Perception Index)
Percent aged 0–14 years
Percent aged 15–64 years
Percent female

1.26
5.02
2.21
87.80
820.25
36.60
0.00004
539.17
0.02
4.12
4.24
114.38
47.57
7.92

0.07
0.18
0.26
6.86
40.20
3.76
0.0001
3.17
0.0000004
0.28
0.15
2.85
2.33
0.27

Appendix 4
Table 5. Description of missing values.
Variable

Number of missing cases

Percent missing

Natural log homicide
Natural log resource rents
GDP per capita (US$ 000)
Gini
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births)
Percent unemployed
Foreign direct investment (US$ 000)
Percent urban
Population (billion)
Democracy (Freedom Index)
Corruption (Corruption Perception Index)
Percent aged 0–14 years
Percent aged 15–64 years
Percent female

915
177
21
1630
52
233
60
15
0
361
484
0
0
0

40.68
7.87
0.93
72.48
2.31
10.36
2.67
0.67
0.00
16.05
21.52
0.00
0.00
0.00

Note: The dataset has a total of 2249 country-years, therefore the percentages in the table are derived from
dividing the number of missing cases by 2249.

